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TELLING TALES: (OR PUTTING THE
PLURAL IN PLURALISM)
BY ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
"We ... are a conversation."
Martin Heidegger'
"Until the lions have their historians, tales of hunting will always glorify the hunter."
Old African Proverb
We are all tellers of tales. Our lives are a struggle to imagine and
enact the best stories we can.2 These stories run from the sublime to
the ridiculous, the ecstatic to the elegaic, the hopeful to the fearful and
the marvellous to the mundane. Only in our fantasies are we anywhere
near free to indulge our dramatic imaginings to their fullest: even then
we are not entirely free for we must dream within the historic experience
of our life stories. In life, we are thrust into a work-in-progress. It is
a sprawling performance that has countless scenes and a profusion of
acts, often being performed simutaneously and repeatedly. Reality be-
comes congruent with these enactments of the habitual stories and stock
tales of the community. To the extent that we get to write and enact
our own lives, we must begin with and respond to the dramatic plot
in which we find ourselves. The story of my life can never be disentangled
from the community's story in which my story develops and gains
significance. While we can never be free of the past or of our communal
connections, we need not become slavish adherents to their perceived
weight and hold. The future of the past is our present and continuing
responsibility. The past has passed and was what it was, but it is up
to us to decide what it will become.
For many, life will be exhausted in playing out the stories of others,
a cameo role on a stage and in a script not of their making. At best,
these enlisted thespians will have to live their stories before they can
tell them. In this sense, "[people] make their own history, but they do
o Copyright, 1985, Allan C. Hutchinson.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, 2d ed. (1956) 247.
2 These initial comments derive from a variety of sources. See A. Hutchinson, "Part of an
Essay on Power and Interpretation (Including Suggestions on How to Make Bouillabaisse)" (1986)
60 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 201.
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not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given, and transmitted from the past."3 We cannot abandon history or
dispossess ourselves of its dramatic heirlooms. We cannot create afresh
our autobiographies. At best, we must play our given roles until we have
the capacity and confidence to re-create ourselves and re-make our world.
The opportunity to experience the exhilarating demands and responsi-
bilities of narrative reconstruction is at the heart of democratic citizenship.
History and human action only take on meaning and intelligibility
within their narrative context and dramatic settings. We are never not
in a story. There are many stories being imagined and enacted, but we
can only listen to them and comprehend them within the vernacular
contexts of other stories. Our conversations about these narratives are
themselves located and scripted in deeper stories that determine their
moral force and epistemological validity. There is no truth nor knowledge
outside the dramatic context and idiom of history. All conversations occur
within history. From the available narrative resources, we are able to
shape and shade the possibilities and parameters of our own identities.
Also, the anthology of communal folk tales tell us how we expect, predict
or assume others will act. Stories are so powerful and pervasive that
they not only lay out a path for us to follow, but also provide a limited
range of dramatic devices and rhetorical strategies for rescripting the
story. It is these dramatic practices and narrative procedures that allow
us to perceive, understand, act, criticize, and change in a mutually
intelligible manner. By simultaneously empowering certain modes of
action and foreclosing others, narrative holds us in a grip that is as powerful
as force of arms. Through the interweaving plots and intricate sub-plots
of the different narratives, people inhabit different worlds; their under-
standing of the world and their normative response to it are substantially
at odds.
'The law' is a potent and institutional story. It is one of the ways
society defines itself and presents the worid to itself. The styling, staging,
and phrasing of the law structure the world in particular and partial
ways. Being normative in nature, law is a way of imagining and has
a distinct theory of its own relationship to a larger nomos., As an intelligible
description of and mutual prescription for action, the legal story pred-
isposes its actors and audience to certain interpretive choices and social
stances. Located and sustained by historical conditions and circumstances,
3 K. Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" in L. Feuer, ed., Basic Writings
on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1959) at 320.
4 See R.M. Cover, "Forward: Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4; C. Geertz,
Local Knowledga" Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983).
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the dramatic performance of the law is socially imposed and, what is
often overlooked, psychologically assumed by individual actors and
members of the audience. Indeed, it is often forgotten that law is a story
that, like all stories, can be rescripted. The struggle to control meaning
and, therefore, the conditions for communal life is fought anew each
day. Existing plots and scenarios are only compelling insofar as they
are constantly reinforced through daily use and rehearsal.
If law is a story, writing about law is a meta-story or a story about
a story. Operating at different levels and from different perspectives,
academics tell stories about the legal story, the way it develops and
changes, the roles and responsibilities of the dramatis personae, and the
like. They perceive their primary task to be both exegetical and editorial.
As exegetes, they clarify and explain the obscurities and mysteries of
the law story, especially as told by its judicial authors. Different schools
of interpretation have formed and there is heated debate over their validity
and value. The performance of this exegetical function inevitably collapses
into a more creative editorial exercise. Academics reorganize and rework
judicial and legislative texts. In so doing, they often embellish, enrich,
or enfeeble the primary texts. This is not an occasion for surprise or
censure, for decoding is always another form of encoding - traduttore,
traditore.5 Occasionally, the academic translator attains such prominence
that the judicial or legislative story-tellers offically re-script the legal
drama and incorporate their telling insights. However, as one of the
foremost interpreters of law, academics possess and exercise considerable
power. Interpretation is at the centre of life and law:
If interpretation is a never-ending task, it is simply because there is nothing to
interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpretation because, when all
is said and done, underneath it all everything is already interpreted.6
I. TOWARD HUMANISTIC PLURALISM
In writing about writing about law, the contributors to this Symposium
engage in a refined and precious exercise. Their stories are further removed
from the social performance of the law story. They offer a critical survey
of the meta-stories of legal scholars. Yet, notwithstanding this, their stories
are no less embedded in the socio-economic and intellectual condi-
S See G. Calabresi, "Thoughts on the Future of Economics in Legal Education" (1983) 33
J. Leg. Ed. 359 at 364: "To translate from one language to another is to betray. That is the translation,
and the betrayal, of an Italian saying: Traduttore, traditore."
6 M. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault- Beyond Structuralism and Henmeneutics, 2d ed.
(1983) at 107 (quoting M. Foucault, "Nietzche, Freud, Marx" in Nietzche (1971) at 189).
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tions of the tellers.7 Situated within a broader narrative framework that
is itself a story about the nature of knowledge-validation and knowled-
ge-denial, all forms of scholarship build on and build a universe of
normative assumptions and propositions. There is no position of theoretical
innocence; the scholar is inextricably implicated in the political struggle
to establish, retain, or change the status quo.
Within the contemporary community of Canadian legal scholars,
the normative and narrative theme is predominantly Arthurian in character
and ambition; it is the stuff of epic romance. As described by the manual
or manifesto for the new Canadian Legal Scholar, there must be a shift
from "recherchesponctuelles (isolated, narrowly focused and rather random
research)" to "recherche sublime (research that involves finding higher
levels of explanation and integration through conceptual and empirical
analysis)."8 In place of the professionally-inspired commitment to tra-
ditional doctrinal work, a Humanistic Pluralism must be developed that
gives equal time and support to fundamental research on law as a social
phenomenon. The challenge is not to turn all plumbers into Periclean
clones, but to accomodate and welcome both plumbers and latter-day
Pericleans into the law school.9 Decked out in the colours of the rainbow,
the new Canadian Legal Scholar is an heroic figure who marches under
the banner 'More is Better' and is selflessly devoted to its own and others'
search for the Scholarly Grail. Yet, like the Arthurian Kingdom of old,
Humanistic Pluralism flatters, but only to deceive. Beneath the adventurous
and daring rhetoric lies an almost feudal form of life. Under the guise
of benignity and openness, Humanistic Pluralism effects a subtle tyranny
of the status quo. ,o
Most of the essayists in this Symposium subscribe to the Arthurian
vision and claim to write to the humanistic beat of its pluralist drum.
Canadian legal scholarship is indicted for its general narrowness of focus
and shallowness of analysis: a positivist mind-set still thrives and dominates
the intellectual milieu. According to the symposiasts, too many academics
are content to serve the reactionary interests of the practicing legal
7 I am aware that the epistemological footings of my own 'story' are even more precarious
as it is a story about stories about stories about a story. Like all stories, it is itself the product
of particular historical and political conditions. See A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold:
Critical Essays on Modem Legal Thought (forthcoming, 1987).
8 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, Law and Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (1983) at 75. I term this intellectual
mind-set 'Arthurian' after the name of its chairperson and leading light, Harry Arthurs. However,
as a matter of fairness it should be noted that Harry Arthurs' personal scholarship is more committed
to the true pluralist credo than that of many of his peers. See, for example, H.W. Arthurs, 'Without
the Law' (1985).
9 W. Twining, "Pericles and the Plumber" (1967) 83 L.Q.Rev. 396.
10 See infra 8-10.
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community and "[t]his orientation tends to result in the production of
technicians rather than creative thinkers."" Being "acquiescent rather
than critical,",2 academics have resisted the broadening and deepening
influence of other disciplinary perspectives and, at their most intransigent,
have struggled to keep the door of the law school firmly shut to those
who would sully the law with such suspect infdltrations.13
Yet the general opinion is not all gloom and doom. The symposiasts
see shafts of light in the bleak castle of contemporary scholarship. If
sensitively and patiently nurtured, this enlightened work can be encour-
aged to suffuse the traditional shadows. This not only would serve to
expose the shoddiness of much mainstream work that has relied on its
shadowy life to conceal its poor quality, but also would allow the best
mainstream work to take a fuller part in the overall jurisprudential project.
Accordingly, the self-imposed task of the symposiasts is to facilitate and
expedite the evolution of more sophisticated scholarship rather than to
demand a revolution in intellectual consciousness and practice. It is a
matter of complementing and supplementing the extant material rather
than doing away with it and starting again. Within the Arthurian Kingdom,
these 'knights of the round table' lead the crusade for the Scholarly Grail
with a much trumpeted belief in the virtues of Pluralism and Pragmatism.
Stressing the 'closed shop' mentality of the common lawyer, Mario
Bouchard urges a shift in academic attention from its present pathological
preoccupation to a more fundamental analysis of the empirico-theoretical
foundations.,, Agreeing with Bouchard that research priorities are too
often set by government, John Claydon and D.M. McRae lament the
fact that much of the promise of the 1970s has not been fulfilled.,5 If
Canadian international law scholarship is to be taken seriously, scholars
must first take themselves seriously and develop a working environment
more suited to theoretical work. Although more optimistic, Marc Gold
warns against the danger of replacing black-letter law with black-letter
theory.6 Along with more inter-disciplinary collaboration, he offers
rhetorical theory as a possible way out of the present impasse and stresses
the importance of understanding the needs and interests of the different
audiences played to by scholarly performances.
I M. Bouchard, "Administrative Law Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 411 at 420.
12 J.E. Claydon & D.M. McRae, "International Legal Scholarship in Canada" (1985) 23 Osgoode
Hall L. 477 at 483.
'3 See G. Parker, "Legal Scholarship and Legal Education" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 653.
14 Supra, note 11.
15 See supra, note 12.
16 See M. Gold, "Constitutional Scholarship in Canada" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 495.
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In a majestic essay, Rod MacDonald offers a tour de force of civil
law scholarship.'1 Highlighting its almost obsessive search for systemic
and intellectual 'purity', he reveals how and why the dominant tradition
is under severe challenge. He concludes that, provided a successful and
indigenous methodology is crafted, this inter-generational conflict offers
brighter prospects than elsewhere in Canada. After an extremely com-
prehensive survey of the field, John McLaren suggests greater dialogue
and intellectual engagement between disciplines and makes an explicit
plea for heightened Pluralism.18 Finally, Leon Trakman continues the
paean to Pluralism. He demands that scholarship take up the sociology
slack between doctrinal exposition and socio-economic conditions. As
though speaking for all his Arthurian colleagues, he concludes that "[t]o
reach the sky, the scholar must learn to fly; no one should reasonably
expect less, nor more."'1
II. FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
Within the ranks of Canadian legal scholars, there are subversive
elements that struggle to resist the siren song of Humanistic Pluralism.
They believe that its romantic call to scholarly arms is a sham: the battle-
cry of 'More is Better' is likely to mean in practice 'More of Much
the Same'. A small and diffuse number of scholars recognize that the
time is well past to grasp the political nettle.o Unlike Ulysses, they do
not plug their ears and tie themselves to some convenient mast, but take
a much more aggressive and combative stance towards pluralism. They
insist that there must be a sharp break in the dramatic conventions of
the scholarly performance and a revolution in narrative consciousness.
Yet, not surprisingly, some of these are not confident enough to break
ranks entirely and burn their institutional bridges. Instead, fortified with
hope rather than conviction, they continue to work for change from within.
Of the symposiasts, Neil Brooks falls into this group; he is a reluctant
rebel with a cause. Condemning the extent to which academics remain
willing hostages to professional interests, he recommends a moratorium
17 See R.A. MacDonald, "Understanding Civil-Law Scholarship in Quebec" (1985) 23 Osgoode
Hall LJ. 573.
18 See I. McLaren, "The Theoretical and Policy Challenges in Canadian Compensation Law"
(1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 609.
19 L.E. Trakman, "Contract and Commercial Law Scholarship in Common Law Canada"
(1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 663 at 680.
20 See, for example, H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced
Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84; and
P. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34 U. Toronto
L.. 47.
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on doctrinal writing which has hitherto only served to legitimize the
power of the bench and bar. He trenchantly criticizes those who pretend
that scholarship can and must be apolitcal:
The charge that is frequently made about scholarship that addresses, for instance,
the influence of social class, political power, and the distribution of wealth on
the law is that it is politicized scholarship. Scholarship ... must be value-free:
it should not reflect the political credo of the author. The notion that scholarship
can adopt a value-neutral stance is such nonsense that its persistence can only
be explained as itself reflecting a political act.... The most obvious way in which
values influence scholarship is simply in what is written about. Values clearly
shape the interests of scholars and influence the types of questions they ask....
A decision to write on a subject that assumes a particular value judgement is
a decision not to write on a subject that opposes it. Consequently, to the extent
that the assumptions underlying an article have political connotations, which they
almost invariably have, writing the article is a substantive political act, no more
neutral than the decision to address the assumptions directly.... Thus, there is
no such thing as 'disinterested' scholarship ... only [a] .question of what kinds
of interests a scholar will serve. The claim of objectivity is simply an excuse for
unaccountability.21
In spite of Brooks' genuine distaste for 'apolitical' scholarship, the
most uncompromising attack on Humanistic Pluralism comes from the
feminist symposiasts. Feminism is the cutting edge of social change and
offers itself as a revolutionary alternative to contemporary practice.
However, while feminists unite in their opposition to women's oppression
by men, they divide on its intellectual basis and, therefore, on the best
strategies to overcome it. In terms of scholarly activities, feminists tend
to share the basic belief that knowledge and gender are not mutually
exclusive categories: metaphysical commitments operate to conceal the
man-made and man-serving construction of reality by making women's
experience and standpoint invisible or trivial.M The feminist ambition
is to rethink and rework not only the human drama, but the way we
think about the idea and experience of what is and can be the human
drama. To multiply the number of female actors and authors is only
part of the task. The drama and performance must be on a wider, more
popular front and by virtue of a different ethic and voice.
The most appropriate way to illustrate the critical and constructive
arguments of the feminist front against pluralism is by way of a story.2 3
Heinz is poor. His wife is going to die. She can be cured by a drug
that costs $1000. Heinz does not have the money. The chemist refuses
21 N. Brooks, "Future Directions in Canadian Tax Law Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 441 at 471-72.
22 For a succinct account of this argument, see V. Held, "Feminism and Epistemology: Recent
work on the Connection Between Gender and Knowledge" (1985) 14 Phil. & PubI. Affs. 296.
23 See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982).
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to lower the price. In responding to the dilemma, Jake thinks that Heinz
should steal the drug. Relying on the conventions of logic, he argues
that life is worth more than money and that, although stealing the drug
would be illegal, it is the 'right thing to do'. Amy is against Heinz stealing
the drug. Seeing in the dilemma a narrative of continuing relations, she
worries about the effect on the wife of Heinz going to jail. Amy wants
to explore the possibility of Heinz borrowing the money or of appealing
to the chemist to defer the payment. In drawing her conclusions from
these responses, Carol Gilligan underlines the different moral universes
inhabited by Jake and Amy:
Considering the moral dilemma to be "sort of like a math problem with humans",
he sets it up as an equation and proceeds to work out the solution. Since his
solution is rationally derived, he assumes that anyone following reason would arrive
at the same conclusion.... In contrast, Amy's response to the dilemma conveys
a very different impression.... [She sees] in the dilemma not a math problem
with humans but a narrative of relationships that extends over time.... Instead,
seeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing alone,
a world that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of
rules, she finds the puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist
to respond to the wife.... Just as [Jake] relies on the conventions of logic to
deduce the solution to this dilemma, assuming these conventions to be shared,
so she relies on a process of communication, assuming connection and believing
that her voice will be heard.... Thus in Heinz's dilemma these two children
see two very different moral problems - Jake a conflict between life and property
that can be resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture of human relationship
that must be mended with its own thread.24
Gilligan does not insist that this moral imagery is biologically
determined. She suggests that both these voices are present in human
dialogue and in ourselves. They exist in tension and have become identified
with 'male' and 'female' voices. Moreover the 'hard' male accent has
tended to drown out the 'soft' female accent. For Gilligan, the challenge
is not to replace one with the other or to redress some vague historical
balance, but to bring together the two voices and transform our moral
discourse. Of course, Gilligan's diagnosis and prescription have not gone
uncontested. For instance, Catharine MacKinnon prefers to emphasize
24 Ibid at 26-31. N
25 This is not the place to survey the debate within feminist circles. An excellent sampler
of views can be found in E. DuBois eL at, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law -
A Conversation" (1985) 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11. This is a transcript of a discussion between five
feminists. Not only do the participants explore the problems and possibilities of feminism, but their
conversation is governed by a dynamic different from typical law school debates and it attempts
to put into practice what they are conversing about. It is an exercise about and in feminism. As
Carrie Menkel-Meadow puts it, "one of the wonderful things that feminist discourse has done
to the law has been to make us look at the method by which we make a new world at the same
time that we argue about the substance of what that new world should be. I hope that some day
there will be unity between the substance and the method." Ibid at 57.
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the political dimensions of the 'Heinz and Amy' story. She points out
that Amy only speaks or, more importantly, is only heard if Jake chooses
to listen. If Jake does not listen, Amy loses: if Amy does not listen,
Jake still wins. For MacKinnon, the point of the story is that, as in law,
"his foot is on her throat."26
In different ways and to different degrees, four of the symposiasts
take up the implications of some of these ideas for the past and future
of Canadian legal scholarship. They combine to expose and criticize
legal scholarship as embodying "a male perspective on the world
masquerading as an objective non-gendered perspective."27 Indeed, the
whole notion of 'scholarship' is assailed. In her wide-ranging essay,
Kathleen Lahey charts the relation between male power and social
knowledge and, as its corollary, the denial of this relation by male-stream
theorizing. Insofar as feminists eschew the extant norms of objectivity,
rationality, and the like, they engage in a necessary form of unscholarly
scholarship. The fervent ambition must be to detach power from the
male points of view and to harness it to the larger project "of losing
the world."28
The remaining three essays make a firm and detailed application
of that thesis to discrete doctrinal scholarship. Mary Jane Mossman
uncovers the deeply conservative and male tendencies of property writing
and condemns its 'closed' mentality. By refocusing the inquiry on "the
how and why for the choice of questions and not the answers,"29 she
unearths the political roots of past-efforts and suggests a new agenda
for property writers. In a similar vien, Christine Boyle tells a pathetic
tale about the domination of Canadian criminal law literature by foreign
heroes and the invisibility of women in academic discourse. She drives
home her arguments by imagining a world in which the central question
is "Is non-feminist work really scholarly?"3o Finally, in the corporate area,
Kathleen Lahey and Sarah Salter not only continue the feminist project
of unmasking the prejudices of existing scholarship, but begin to rethink
the legal principles that determine the moral order in which bureaucratic
organizations exist. All the essays conclude by urging academics to
26 Ibid at 74-75.
27 C. Boyle, "Criminal Law and Procedure: Who Needs Tenure?" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 427 at 428.
28 See K.A. Lahey,"'... Until Women Themselves Have Told All That They Have to Tell..
(1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 519.
29 MJ. Mossman, "Toward 'New Property' and 'New Scholarship': An Assessment of Canadian
Property Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 633 at 641.
30 Supra, note 27, at n. 63.
19851
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
contribute to the monumental task of (re)making the world a better place
to live. and love.
Ill. AGAINST HUMANISTIC PLURALISM
One of the strengths of these feminist essays is their exposure of
the false promises and claims of Humanistic Pluralism. For all of their
chest-beating (and brow-beating), the disciples of Humanistic Pluralism
share many of the same operative and tacit assumptions as those scholars
they criticise and chastise. Indeed, the major contribution of these critics
is to reinforce and perpetuate the extant order of scholarly values. At
the heart of the academic establishment is the lingering belief in a unitary
truth, a reliance on instrumental rationality, a denial of ideology, and
an insistence on the possibility of objective, in the sense of ahistorical
and apolitical, standards for scholarly worth. In short, while Humanistic
Pluralism is celebrated as a triumphal salute to tolerance and diversity,
it is little more than a monotonous threnody of hope abused and forever
deferred. The problem is not so much its pluralistic aspiration, but its
monoistic and conservative performance. The true promise of a radical
pluralism is lost and perverted in its stunted practice.
The aerial imagery of Leon Trakman's 'flying' metaphor3, captures
the appeal and failing of Humanistic Pluralism. Packaged and promoted
as a soaring and stirring tale of comradely striving and boundless
adventure, it is not so much a flight to anything, as a flight from everything.
Scholars' heads may be in the clouds, but their feet are fixed firmly
in the warm clay of history. No study of the study of law can ever
be apolitical or ahistorical. Although claiming to be beyond ideology
or, at least, neutral as to competing ideologies, Humanistic Pluralism
has a very marked ideological slant and bite to it. Political aloofness
and indifference is an insidious form of betrayal and amounts to a thinly-
veiled fanfare for a slightly reformed status quo. As Al Katz puts it,
"If the middle way is the truth, it is not the middle way but simply
a form of absolutism."32 Commitment to meaningful change is pushed
aside by the crushing and uncompromising weight of orthodoxy: plus
a change, plus c'est la ngme chose.
In the Arthurian world of scholarship, everyone is welcome provided
that they are a humanistic pluralist. While the pluralist constitution
formally entrenches the faith in relativity and diversity, the contemporary
regime of Canadian scholarship is far from a democratic and egalitarian
31 See supra, note 19.
32 A. Katz, "Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics" (1979)
28 Buff. L. Rev. 383 at 435.
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republic - Humanistic Pluralism is King: radical pluralists need not apply.
Furthermore, the current state of affairs perpetuates itself through breeding
future scholarly citizens in its own image. People are not unencumbered
or unsituated, but are located and involved in historical communities.
As Lord Tennyson put it, "I am part of all that I have met." The Arthurian
world is not a society in which no particular type of person outnumbers
any other, but is a society that promotes a particular way of life in which
Humanistic Pluralists thrive and outnumber all others.
Although directed towards the evasion and transcendence of history,
theorizing and scholarship are grounded in historical circumstance.
Theories are produced in specific socio-historical situations and help to
generate a particular version of history. Human reason and discourse
are the prized possessions of a social heritage. Rationality cannot divest
itself of history and reach an ahistorical truth. Legal scholarship can
never be more than a stylized literary genre and, like all literary genres,
it is beholden to its historical milieu.33 Theoretical discourse has no
privileged status above other discursive practices. Scholars begin and
end with their own cherished values. By a circuitous process of reasoning,
they manage to confer universal validity on their preferred values and
interests.
An integral component of Humanistic Pluralism is the pervasive
reliance on instrumental rationality; this ties together the seemingly
disparate threads of contemporary scholarship and effectively excludes
all forms of non-instrumental scholarship. The Arthurian scholar imagines
that social change can be effected by looking at the world, diagnosing
the malaise, and prescribing a customised dose of legal change: everything
is as it seems and can be experienced directly. There is presumed to
be a direct causal link between law and social behaviour. Yet this whole
instrumental mind-set fails to appreciate the important 'ideological'
dimension and function of law; there can be no unmediated experience
of social reality. For instance, constitutional adjudication does not so
much cause or condition, but comprises and is constitutive of existing
social life.3, Legal discourse is a particularly potent medium for negotiating
and constructing social reality. It is one of the ways society defines and
presents the world to itself.
While the state often relies on crude force or threats to achieve
its ends, its strength and long-term viability stem from its successful
use of law. The discursive practices that comprise the language of the
33 See R_ Rorty, "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism" (1981)
64 Monist 155.
34 These ideas are explored in much greater detail in A. Hutchinson, "Charter Litigation and
Social Change: Legal Battles and Social Wars" in Charter Litigation (forthcoming, 1986).
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law structure the world in particular and partial ways. Charter-talk, for
example, is a rhetorical medium of the most potent kind. Constitutional
litigation must not be thought of as an independent variable in society
and as sharing a complicated and, perhaps, unfathomable cause-and-
effect relation with society. Adjudication and other social phenomena
are part and parcel of the same thing: law, courts, property regimes,
civil rights, and the like interpenetrate in manifold ways. In modem society,
it is almost impossible to describe or account for social practices without
describing or accounting for the legal relations among and within them.3"
Law and adjudication are not important because they cause anything
to happen, but because they form part of an integrated and rhetorical
system of social control and ordering. If we really want to change society,
we must stop thinking about the legal process in instrumental terms and
start to appreciate its discursive and ideological dimension.
The critical upshot of all this is that modes of thinking are themselves
revealed as contingent. Humanistic Pluralism has originated and matured
at a particular time and serves particular interests. The historical in-
troduction and institutionalization of the search for the ahistorical
foundations of knowledge and truth operate to freeze existing patterns
of social and intellectual relations. It legitimates an established distribution
of power by conferring on it a spurious but respected ontological status.
Importantly, this epistemological strategy has constrained and controlled
our appreciation of the historical imperative itself; it has sought to persuade
us to turn a deaf ear to the subversive message of historical contingency.
There is no position of theoretical innocence or indifference. Any act
of scholarship, in either its practical or theoretical performance, has an
indissociable political and historical dimension. The question of what
amounts to valid knowledge about legal phenomena is itself a political
matter: legal epistemology is ideological warfare fought by other means.
The traditional view is that politics and knowledge are separate
entities; knowledge can only arise and exist outside the sphere of politics'
corrupting influence. Yet, when knowledge is valid, it can engender and
sustain politics. My story is to challenge this critical separation and to
demonstrate how politics and knowledge are mutually generative and
supportive. Politics is as much the producer of knowledge as its product.
While politics cannot be exercised or effective without knowledge, the
production of knowledge impinges on and nurtures politics. The hidden
agendas of politics are secreted within the interstices of 'scientific' codes
of knowledge:
35 See R. Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 at 103-5.
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in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations
of [politics] which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these
relations of [politics] cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor imple-
mented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a
discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy
of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association.
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth.36
IV. TOWARD RADICAL PLURALISM
My own story has been to suggest that we must re-stage and re-
craft the saga of Canadian legal scholarship. Although the pluralist tale
recounts an escape from the crumbling castle of Absolute Truth, modern
scholars still live in the neighbouring fields and work in its capacious
shadow. It is a traditional and grim fable of conformity and acquiescence
based on superstition and fear, it is reminiscent of the Flat Earth story.
Any exploration or expedition that pushes beyond the Arthurian horizon
will, so the story goes, result in heretics dropping off the rational world
and landing in an anarchic nihilism where only might is right and chaos
has full reign. This simple allegory still manages to hold scholarship
in its iron(ic) grip. Yet it could only begin to make sense in a pseudo-
modernist narrative where there lingers a mystic belief in some objective
certainty, even if it remains perennially out of sight and out of reach.
The moral despair that is associated with a rejection of the Humanistic
Pluralist project is a figment of its own imagination. History shows that
tyranny and repression thrive more where there is a widespread belief
that absolute knowledge is at hand than in circumstances where there
is a healthy distrust of such claims. Indeed, the recognition and acceptance
that knowledge and politics are symbiotically related does not sabotage
the possibility of any moral life, but forces us to take responsibility for
our present predicament and future prospects. Humanistic Pluralism seeks
to persuade us that the impersonal and anonymous hand of reason will
choose for us among the smorgasbord of moral solutions on offer in
the Arthurian restaurant at the end of the moral universe. But, when
all is said and done, we are the chefs and the diners. We create, cook,
and consume these moral offerings. There is no impersonal or anonymous
hand to rescue or relieve us from the heavy responsibility of making
our own moral choices. The only hand at work belongs to the restaurant's
proprietors: it is the iron fist of the status quo in the velvet glove of
Humanistic Pluralism.
36 M. Foucault, PowerlKnowledge (1980) at 93.
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The turn to conversation is fraught with difficulties. By abandoning
the search for foundational truths, we enhance the possibilities for the
powerless to engage in the essential dialogue of world-(re)making, but
provide ample opportunities for the powerful to dominate that conver-
sation. As conversants and story-tellers, we are front-line combatants
in the daily struggle to resist, reproduce, or change the world. We can
never escape the historical context of our efforts in narrative construction.
But, armed with that knowledge, we can guard against its hegemonic
impulses. We are not condemned either to idolize existing discursive
practices or to degenerate into a desultory solipsism. Within the contingent
space between the customary accent of power and its evolving dialect,
people might better be able to engage history, exercise their imaginative
potential, and enact their own life stories.
As a conversational idiom, Humanistic Pluralism constricts the range
of dialogic choices in the name of greater choice. By insisting on a 'neutral'
mode of discourse in which no one can claim to have a vision of the
good life that is better than anyone else's,37 it removes from the scholarly
agenda the most important of all possible topics. In effect, it renders
the establishment of a radical pluralism unattainable and undesirable.
Even though the good life might be exhausted in looking for the good
life, we need more, not less, debate about what we can become and
the world we could make for ourselves. We must stretch and enlarge
the discursive resources at our disposal so that we can go beyond the
traditional boundaries of social life and bring back linguistic records
of our imaginative adventures. The seductive melody of Humanistic
Pluralism must be resisted. Instead, we must work together so that we
can "oppose inhumanity in different songs of joy."38 In abandoning this
Arthurian strain of pluralism, it will be necessary to learn a different
ethic and to respond to a different dynamic:
In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation,
the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They
depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the question is merely
exercising the right that has been given to him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive
a contradiction, to ask for more information, to emphasize different postulates,
to point out faulty reasoning, etc. As for the person answering the questions, he
too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion: by the logic of his
own discourse he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of
dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the other....
The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he
possesses in advance and that he will never agree to question. On principle, he
37 See for example, B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980), and Reconstructing
American Law (1984).
38 B. Agger, "On Happiness and the Damaged Life" in I O'Neill, ed., On Critical Theory
(1976) 12 at 32.
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possesses rights authorizing him to make war and making the struggle a just
undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner..., but an adversary, an
enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence constitutes a threat.
For him, then, the [dialogue] does not consist of recognizing this person as a
subject having the right to speak, but of abolishing him from any possible dialogue;
and his final objective will be ... to bring about the triumph of the just cause
he has manifestly been upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on
a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.
3 9
V. BEYOND BABEL
Once upon a time, a tribe conquered a land to the North. Although
the local population spoke a variety of tongues and dialects, everyone was
soon 'persuaded' to speak the same language. The tribal elders announced
that they would build a city and a tower so unprecedented in size that
it would stand as an unparalleled mega-monument to man's prowess and
power, it would be an obelisk of pride and intimidation. Construction and
completion of the tower soon became the raison d'ftre of its whole economy
and national life. All its resources and efforts were slowly but surely being
exhausted in this magnificent obsession. While never modest in scope, the
plans for the tower became increasingly elaborate and ambitious. With
its completion seemingly further away than the day they started, the tower
simply collapsed of its own weight Many were killed in the disaster, but
some survived They dispersed throughout the land New languages were
developed and old dialects were revived
Traditionally, this has been told and heard as a cautionary tale of
conceit and come-uppance, impiety and imperfection, and destiny and
despair. Yet, as I interpret it, it is not a curse from which we must deliver
ourselves, but a blessing that we seem unwilling to accept. Theorizing
is not some grand architectonic structure, but more a vast force field
in which no assertion is immune from revision4o Hubris remains the
singular quality of the modem scholar- humility is more befitting and
modesty more called for. The ambition to build a new Camelot (was
there ever an old one?) on Canadian scholarly soil is as ill-conceived
and, hopefully, as ill-fated as its Babelian predecessor. At certain times,
it is more productive to destroy for the sake of our own generation than
to build for eternity4, Humanistic Pluralism is one place to begin.
39 M. Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations" in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault
Reader (1984) at 381-2.
40 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (1953) at 42.
41 See R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) at 369.
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